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PROPOSED CHANGES TO JAPANESE AND UNITED
STATES PATENT LAW ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS*
Marvin Motsenbocker
Abstract: Recent changes made to Japanese and American patent procedural laws
have not addressed the contentious issue of patent enforcement. Purely technical decisions concerning patent rights and their enforcement need to be consistent between
jurisdictions of each country. Courts of both countries are second guessing purely technical decisions of their patent offices and interfering with the smooth and predictable
development of new technology and its associated rights. This particularly hurts noncitizen patentees who are unfamiliar with the particular legal customs of the other
country. It is proposed that technical patent scope determination during Japanese patent
infringement litigation be delegated to the Japanese Patent Office and that technical patent validity determinations during U.S. patent infringement litigation be delegated to the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. The scientists and engineers who are dedicated to this
common task at the U.S. and Japanese patent offices are best qualified to make these
decisions which often affect patent rights of non-citizen patentees.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between the United Statesand Japan has been soured
by complaints about each other's patent laws and policies. U.S. politicians

have called for pressure on the Japanese to resist non-tariff intellectual
property barriers to U.S. companies who want to do business in Japan. 1 The
U.S. General Accounting Office released a report in August 1993, that
describes the frustrations with Japanese patent laws and claims that these
laws dilute the value of U.S. inventors' patent rights in Japan. 2 Similarly,
Japanese commentators have complained of unfair U.S. laws that give
preferential treatment to domestic companies involved in litigation and give

* Part of this note pertaining to the United States patent reexamination system is reproduced from
"Proposed Changes to the United States Patent Law to Eliminate Unnecessary Litigation," Marvin
Motsenbocker, John MarshallLaw Review, Summer 1994, and is reproduced with the permission of the
John Marshall Law Review. The author expresses sincere appreciation to Professor Donald S. Chisum at
the University of Washington School of Law for his valuable comments. The author also expresses sincere
appreciation to Professor Toshiko Takenaka who taught him much about Japanese and German patent law
and made it possible to complete this Comment.
I Rockefeller Introduces Special 301 Bill TargetingJapan's Patent Law Inadequacies, Int'l Trade
Daily (BNA), Aug. 31, 1992, availablein LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAITD File.
2 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-93-126, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: U.S.
COMPANIES' PATENT EXPERIENCES IN JAPAN 1-10 (1993) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
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special rights to inventors on U.S. territory. 3 Some newspapers have even
referred to this problem as "the patent war." 4
As a result of patent law friction, Japanese and American negotiators
pledged to alter their administrative patent laws, and Japan has made major
changes to its law. 5 These changes to the administration of patent law are
new and in many respects have not yet been implemented. It is evident,
however, that the changes proposed thus far do not address the more
important problem of patent enforcement in Japan and the U.S.6
This Comment argues that the U.S.-Japan patent law dispute stems
largely from a legal court's inability to properly handle technical issues. An
underlying theme to the patent enforcement problem in Japan and the U.S.
is that these countries' patent offices share responsibility with their courts
for patent enforcement. Technical patent issues are initially decided by
scientific personnel in each country's patent office using common
principles, but then are often re-decided by technically uninformed judges
and juries when the patents are enforced. 7 As a result, businesses that
develop technology and the public cannot fully rely on patent rights.
Moreover, this interference in the technical work of the patent agencies
reflects non-scientific, cultural nuances of each country and thus hurts
foreign patent holders more than domestic ones.8 As technological
3 See Clayton Jones, Japan, US. to Clarify Patent Rules, CHRISTIAN SCl. MONITOR, Oct. 8, 1992, at
8.
4 Bruce Stokes, Title Fights, 24 NAT'L J. 1236 (1992); see also U.S. Fixation with Patents Hurts
TechnologicalProgress,NIKKEI WKLY., Apr. 1I,1992, at 6.
5 See Nobuo Monya, Revision of the JapanesePatent and Utility Model System, 3 PAC. RIM L. &
POL'Y J. 227 (Marvin Motsenbocker & Hiroki Mitsumata trans., 1994); see also WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, RECORDS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A
TREATY SUPPLEMENTING THE PARIS CONVENTION AS FAR AS PATENTS ARE CONCERNED, VOL. I: FIRST
PART OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE art. 21 (1991) [hereinafter WIPO] (explaining the extent of
protection and interpretation of patent claims under the proposed treaty). Note that this WIPO document
and its terms were never agreed to.
6 A patent only gives the owner the right to sue others to prevent them from making, using, or
selling the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
Japanese courts are not allowed to judge patent validity but determine the technical scope of
claims. The Japan Patent Office ("JPO") can invalidate patents via a procedure called "Trial for invalidation of patent." Patent Law § 123, translatedin AIPPI JAPAN, JAPANESE LAWS RELATING TO INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY (Japan Patent Office trans., 1992) [hereinafter JAPANESE LAWS]. Litigation in U.S. courts often
centers around a jury redetermining all technical issues. Ronald B. Coolley, Obviousness: Jury
DeterminationandReview by the FederalCircuitCourt of Appeals, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
201,203 (1985).
8 In the United States, juries comprised of U.S. (but of course not Japanese) citizens often second
guess technical decisions of the U.S. Patent and Trade Office during litigation. Juries typically are biased,
and this is taken advantage of by skilled litigators. See David B. Graeven, Bringingthe Juror Back into
Intellectual Property Litigation, LAW WORKS, Feb. 1994, at 14-15. In the Japanese system, patents are
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advances are rapidly distributed throughout the world and as Japan and the
U.S. become more interdependent, these national differences are becoming
less acceptable. In order to harmonize the patent systems of both countries,
courts should decide technical patent issues the same way for a given
invention.
This Comment proposes that the U.S. and Japan eliminate national
differences in patent enforcement by shifting responsibility for resolving
technical patent issues during litigation from the courts to each country's
patent office. Such a change would allow the courts to focus on their
judicial responsibilities without interfering with the international
development of technology and its associated property rights.
This Comment begins by summarizing patent granting and
enforcement procedures in Japan and the U.S. Part II highlights the
differences between the two countries, while Part IV summarizes attempts
by negotiators to ameliorate the patent problem by changing Japanese and
American procedural laws. Parts III and IV address the judicial problem of
weak Japanese patents and propose solutions. Finally, Part V addresses
concerns over excessive litigation of patent matters in the U.S. and Part VI
proposes a solution to this problem.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

Two Components of the PatentLaw Systems in the U.S. and Japan

Patent rights arise from two mechanisms: 1) the administrative
mechanism used to create a private patent grant for a technology that was
never available to the public before; and 2) the enforcement mechanism by
which patent rights are exercised by infringement proceedings in a court of
law.
An administrative agency, the Japan Patent Office ("JPO") in Japan
and the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") in the U.S., is
responsible for administering the first component by issuing patents.
Patents are granted after an inventor or assignee submits an application that
contains a written description of the invention and a set of claims that
rarely enforced by the courts. This lack of enforcement hurts inventors of basic new technologies more
than inventors who make minor copycat changes to old technology. Until now, U.S. inventors have
excelled in such basic technology and some feel that they are discriminated against in Japan. See generally
131 CONG. REc. S12,805 (statement of Sen. D'Amato) (explaining the "crisis" caused by Japan's unfair
trade practices); GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 4-6.
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describe the metes and bounds of the intellectual property to be protected.
The patent office then conducts a protracted dialogue with the applicant,
typically over a period of a few years, in which objections made by the
patent office are countered by the applicant. During this process the
specific claim language and its meaning are determined. Each patent
agency uses three specific criteria to decide if an invention is patentable,
including determining whether the idea is new, useful, and non-obvious
compared to previously known technology. Once patented, the same
criteria are sometimes used to decide if the patent is valid. 9
Courts, on the other hand, are primarily responsible for the enforcement of patents granted by the patent office. When a patent holder enforces
the patent in infringement proceedings, the court reads the patent "claims"
and decides on their meaning and scope. An accused infringer's technology
is appraised and compared with the patented invention to see if it is covered
by that invention's claims. If so, the court may find infringement and the
patent holder can collect damages.
These two mechanisms exist in both Japan and the U.S., albeit with
some differences between the two. The procedural laws in both countries
allow the public to appeal to the patent office to review the validity of a patent that may have been granted in error. However, in Japan, the JPO has the
exclusive right to invalidate issued patents.'o In the U.S., an interested
party can present evidence of prior art to the PTO by requesting (and paying
for) a reexamination of a patent."l However, this is not done often, possibly
because the courts do not give much weight to an ex-parte proceeding in
which only one side (the patentee) is allowed to respond to arguments of the
12
PTO and to appeal the results.
In Japan, the public is allowed an additional low cost opportunity
called "opposition" during patent procurement to help the JPO weed out
9 In Japan, a patent is defined as a highly advanced creation of a technical idea making use of a law
of nature. Only inventions that are industrially applicable are patentable. Patent Law §§ 2(1), 29, in
JAPANESE LAWS, supra note 7. In the United States, a patent can be obtained for the invention or discovery
of any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
10 4 ZENTARO KITAGAWA ET AL., DOING BusINEsS IN JAPAN pt. VI § 2.13[l] (1994) [hereinafter
DOING BusINEsS].

11 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (1988).
12 Congress expected 2000 examinations per year but there are only about 350 per year. One reason
for this may be that the originally proposed reexamination procedure was watered down by the bar such
that the party requesting reexamination has virtually no rights. As a result, most patent validity questions
are still resolved by expensive court trials. See Robert B. Benson, The New Reexamination Law-A
Legislative History 9 AM. PAT. L. ASS'N Q.J. 227,230-31 (1980).
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Opposition is an
patent applications that are not patentable. 13
administrative procedure performed after a patent is published but before its
granting whereby interested parties can submit reasons to the JPO for not
allowing a patent to be issued. In the U.S., both the courts and the PTO are
free to invalidate a patent, and invalidation by either is sufficient to
extinguish the patent right. Japanese courts however, cannot invalidate
patents but have the option (as do U.S. courts) to suspend litigation if there
is a reasonable chance that the patent office will invalidate a patent being
litigated.Z4

The court systems of Japan and the U.S. manage patent cases differently. In the U.S., only federal District Courts hear patent infringement
cases between private parties.' 5 The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit ("CAFC") was established in 1980 to assume exclusive appellate
responsibility and make policy.16 The Supreme Court tends to take a handsoff view of patent matters. These appellate courts do not hear testimony
and rely heavily on District Court juries for determination of factual
matters.
In Japan, the Osaka and Tokyo District Courts are most often used for
patent infiingement litigation and have established patent departments to
carry out this responsibility.17 The Tokyo High Court oversees the
activities of the JPO and handles appeals from the lower courts. Unlike
U.S. appellate courts, Japanese appellate courts can hear evidence and take
testimonyl 8
The division of patent right responsibility between the different
branches of the government complicates the problem of harmonizing patent
law between Japan and the U.S. The patent granting agency may use different criteria than the courts for determining patent validity and for

13 In 1993, 6,620 oppositions were filed at the JPO, and 1,986 were accepted. The total number of
examined patents was 88,559, which means that 7.4% of patents filed are subject to some form of challenge by opposition. Of the challenged patent applications, about a third are refused initially, and about
one quarter are eventually rejected. JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 12-13, 43-44
(1993? 4 See DOING BUSINESS supra note 10, § 2.13[1];
Patent Law § 168(2), in JAPANESE LAWS, supra
note 7.
15 All civil patent cases are heard in federal District Courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988).
16 See Jack Q. Lever, Jr., The New Court of Appealsfor the FederalCircuit (PartI), 64 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y J. 178 (1982).
17 See Mark F. Wachter, PatentEnforcement in Japan: An American Perspectivefor Success, 19
AM. PAT. L. ASS'N Q.J. 59, 63 (1991).
18 Id. at 65.
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To the extent non-citizens do not

understand these ambiguities, they are unable to use the other nation's
patent system to its fullest potential and naturally feel they are discriminated
20
against.
International negotiators often come from the executive

and

legislative branches of their governments. 2 1 Consequently, treaties and
other international agreements between the U.S. and Japan usually concern
the administrative law mechanisms governing patent rights and not the
important judicial enforcement mechanism. U.S. and Japanese negotiators
have made welcome improvements to U.S. and Japanese administrative

laws governing the acquisition of patent rights in response to pressure for
harmonization of patent laws. 22 But the issue of enforcement deserves more
attention.
B.

Pressure From Both Sides Towards Harmonization Has Led to
Changes in AdministrativeLaw Only

1.

JapaneseAdministrative Law Changes

The primary complaint of American companies concerning the
Japanese patent system is that their inventions receive weak protection in
Japan.23 Some U.S. companies even claim that it is not worth the effort and
expense to patent their inventions in Japan.24 This poor perception of
Japanese patents reflects the inability to enforce them.
19 See Ethicon v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The Ethicon court addressed the
problem of simultaneous patent validity determination by the PTO and by a court. The Ethicon court
declared that "the PTO and the court employ different standards of proof when considering validity, and
the courts, unlike the PTO during a reexamination of patent claims, are not limited to review of prior art
patents or printed publications." Id at 1427. The court further explained that, "the two forums take different approaches in determining patent invalidity and on the same evidence could quite correctly come to
different conclusions." Id at 1428.
20 Michael N. Meller, Is the Japanese Patent Law a Potential Trade Barrier?, 33 AIPPI J. 110
(19881i For example, the principal Japanese negotiator
to the WIPO patent harmonization talks, Mr.
Uemura, is an official of MITI and the principal U.S. negotiators were from the U.S. Commerce
Department. WIPO, supranote 5, at 534-35.
22 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (implementing
the Uruguay Round GATT agreements in 1994).
23 See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 10; Rockefeller IntroducesSpecial 301 Bill TargetingJapan's
Patent Law Inadequacies,supranote 1, at I.
24 U.S. companies' criticism of patent protection in Japan is not universal. Some companies feel that
they have encountered no particular difficulties in Japan. See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 4-6.
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The complaint of weak patents was also applicable to U.S. patents before the CAFC unified patent law in the U.S.25 In Japan, enforcement
efforts have been less successful. Possibly fewer than one fourth of
Japanese patents are enforceable. 26 Such a low enforcement rate indicates
that holders of Japanese patents may suffer the same fate that U.S. patent
holders confronted before the creation of a pro-patent court. Although this
seems to be a judicial problem, most attention has been paid to the
perceived inequities in the granting of patents.
The attention on administrative law resulted in Japan making major
changes in its laws to shorten the time required to prosecute a Japanese
patent application. 27 In 1987, Japan introduced a western-style multiple
claim system which allows alternative versions of an invention to be stated
in the claims rather than in separate patent applications.28 In January 1994,
the Japanese patent system was revised to shorten the time it takes to obtain
a patent.29 Recently, Japan has agreed to accept patent applications written

in English.3 0 These major changes should be beneficial to U.S. applicants
for Japanese patents.
Negotiations with the American government officials and private parties have not, however, resulted in any changes to the judicial enforcement
of patents in Japan. An opportunity existed through the World Intellectual
Property Organization ("WIPO") patent harmonization treaty talks to affect
judicial doctrines used for determining infringement between Japan, the
U.S. and other countries. 3 1 While the WIPO treaty did not come to fruition,
25 Before 1982, U.S. patents had little value and were rarely enforced against infringers. Forum
shopping allowed defendants to select a district court that would be reluctant to enforce monopolies against
copiers of inventions.
26 See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY, CASES AND MATERIALS 683 (1992).
Many infringement cases are brought in Japan. However, there were only 21 district court decisions in
1989. As noted by one observer, "Out of the 21 aforementioned cases, infringement was found in only
four, in the remaining 17, the court decided that there was no infringement. This is suggestive of a general
climate of patent litigation in Japan where enforcement of patents through a court is not an easy task."
Hideo Ozaki, How Can a Patentbe Successfully Enforcedin Japan?, PAT. WORLD, Mar. 1991, at 36.
27 See Monya, supra note 5, at 231-37.
28 Patent Law § 38, in JAPANESE LAWS, supranote 7.
29 See Monya, supra note 5, at 229-30.
30 See Andrew Pollack, U.S. Agrees to Alter Patents, Periodof Coverage. N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20,
1994, at D2. A big complaint of the United States was that, unlike in the United States where an
application can be filed in any language, with a translation filing made later, and the ability to correct
translation errors long after filing, the JPO only accepted applications in Japanese, and more importantly,
errors in translation could not be corrected. In 1994 Japan agreed to change this procedural law.
31 The World Intellectual Property Organization patent treaty negotiation contained provisions for
harmonization of patent protection in countries including the United States and Japan. For example, art. 21
of the draft treaty (Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims) contained language that would have
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the WIPO negotiations demonstrated many of the difficulties inherent to
patent law harmonization.
The WIPO negotiations included discussions about patent
enforcement and could have resulted in pressure on the Japanese courts to
increase the use of the doctrine of equivalents. (The doctrine of equivalents

is a judicial doctrine by which the extent, or scope of a patent right is not
limited to the literal reading of the patent but is extended to obvious minor
modifications of it.) However, there was little or no discussion of the
differences between judicial systems of the different countries. 32 Many

disagreements (including the U.S.-Japan patent problem) stemmed from
these differences. For example, the Japanese proposed a change in treaty
wording by which the doctrine of equivalents would be made less
mandatory on the courts (more discretion to the judges) because otherwise,
the requirement to use this doctrine would be automatically satisfied even if

the requirement was in the "prior art," or public knowledge prior to the
invention. 33 What the Japanese delegate did not say, and what the U.S.

representative did not seem to understand, is that unlike in the U.S. court
system, such a requirement in Japan would require Japanese courts to
enforce patents against others who are using only prior art.34 Obviously
both sides should thoroughly understand the problems and nuances of the

others' judiciary in these kinds of negotiations, yet it seems they may have
underestimated the changes that can take place if their patent enforcement
systems were more harmonized. If the WIPO treaty had been signed with a

strong doctrine of equivalents element, the U.S. delegation could have
achieved a significant concession for beleaguered U.S. holders of Japanese
patents. The treaty draft that was negotiated would have forced the
Japanese courts to use the doctrine of equivalents in all patent infringement
cases.
mandated that courts in participating countries, including Japan, give stronger protection to patents. In
particular, the treaty would have required that patent claims be read non-literally. This document would
have directly worked against the tendency of limiting patent claim scope to examples in the specification.
It stated: "[T]he claims shall not be interpreted as limited to those examples." WIPO, supra note 5,art. 21.
If the Japanese courts were to follow this and other provisions of the draft treaty, they would not interpret
patent claims so narrowly by limiting them to specific features of examples in the specification. U.S.
inventors could greatly benefit as a result. Id.
32 Id.
33 See id.
at 442.
34 U.S. courts can invalidate patents but Japanese courts can only attack patent scope to do this.
Thus, forcing them to find infringement when the accused device is identical to both the patent claims and
previously known prior art would create great injustices in the absence of other changes to Japanese court
doctrine or practice.
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The U.S. declared that it was unable to continue WIPO negotiations
because it was asked to make more basic changes to its laws than other
countries and because it wanted to extract more significant changes in
patent systems of other countries. 35 It is regrettable that the talks were
suspended because their successful conclusion might have resulted in the
strengthening of Japanese patents by the greater use of the doctrine of
equivalents.
2.

U.S. Administrative Law Changes

The Japanese have had two major complaints concerning the
First, the U.S. first-to-invent principle
American patent system.
discriminates against Japanese. 36 Second, U.S. juries often discriminate
against Japanese litigants. 37 Recent changes in U.S. administrative law
have dealt with the first issue, but the second cannot be remedied by
administrative law changes.
Under the first-to-invent principle, the PTO grants a patent to the
party who can show first conception of the invention and reduction of the
idea to practice.3 8 However, under the U.S. law, the first inventor's right
existed only for inventions made in the U.S. Discrimination against nonU.S. patent applicants occurred because they could not obtain early
invention dates from the moment of invention, unlike their U.S.-citizen
counterparts who could claim earlier invention based on notebook entries if
the act of invention occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.
Since only the first inventor in the U.S. can receive a patent, being first is all
important. 39
35 The principal U.S. negotiator left the meeting early and explained that great changes were
required of the U.S. patent system whereas smaller changes were required to other countries' patent
systems to conclude a treaty. The U.S. Secretary of Commerce declared on January 24, 1994, that the
United States was suspending its negotiations indefinitely. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, U.S. Says "Not
Now" to Resumption ofPatentHarmonizationTalks, Jan. 24, 1994 (press release).
36 Jones, supranote 3, at 8.
37 Id
38 35 U.S.C § 102(g) (1988).
39 When two different inventors file for and/or obtain the same patent an "interference proceeding"
in the PTO decides who will finally get the patent right based on the first to invent principle. An examination of interference proceeding statistics published by the U.S. PTO indicates that for the 3-year period of
1986 through 1988, about 51% of U.S. citizens won patent priority contests against non-U.S. citizens.
Since nearly half of all foreign applicants win such priority challenges, there does not appear to be widespread systematic discrimination against non-U.S. applicants by allowing first to invent rights only to U.S.
citizens. Ian A. Calvert & Michael Sofocleous, Interference Statisticsfor Fiscal Years 1986 to 1988, J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y, May 1989, at 399, 408.
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The U.S. has recently remedied this inequity by giving inventors from
other GATT countries the same first-to-invent rights as their American colleagues. 40 This is a step in the right direction for equal treatment, but
creates problems for non-U.S. inventors by requiring that their inventive
activities satisfy the unusual U.S. first-to-invent legal requirements. Now,
in order to obtain full rights irl any country of the world with the exception
of the U.S., an inventor simply has to file an application. 4 1 The inventor's
actions, including recording of invention, reducing the basic idea to
practice, signing personal records, countersigning these records by
particular parties that are not co-inventors, and witnessing these documents,
are not necessary and are rarely taken.4 2 However, these time consuming
tasks are necessary for inventors to fully use the American first-to-invent
system in order to prove date of conception and diligent reduction to
practice of inventive ideas. Thus, this change in U.S. patent administrative
law will force Japanese inventors who want to exercise their U.S. first-toinvent rights to change their work habits to satisfy U.S. judicial doctrines of
evidence. 43 Since a major purpose of patent law harmonization is to remove
the burdensome non-technical requirements from inventors, this change to
U.S. law may well exacerbate the U.S.-Japan patent law problem.
Furthermore, it may shift even more responsibility for the operation of the
patent system to the courts by making the taking of depositions and other
evidence overseas a necessary part of determining first-to-invent patent
rights.
The second complaint of the Japanese concerning U.S. patent rights is
that such rights are litigated too often in front of subjective American juries
that look after U.S. company interests over foreign company interests. 44
The alleged bias is seen as a major cause of a so-called "patent war" by the
40 This change was made as part of the GATT implementing legislation. Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). These changes generally become effective
on January 1, 1996.
41 All countries except the United States and the Philippines sponsor a race to the patent office
wherein only being the first to register an idea is determinative.
42 In first-to-file patent application countries such as Japan, acts that occur before filing do not need
to be documented.
43 In the United States, an inventor has rights from the moment of conception. However, it often
takes a great deal of documented evidence to prove this. For example, ifa patent applicant fails to prove
that he diligently worked to reduce his conception to practice he can not claim this right. And other
activities, such as seeking money to pursue the work can abolish this right. For example, Kanamaru, at
Takeda Chemical Industries won a contest with a Corell University professor who could not prove
diligence at reducing his invention to practice. See Griffith v. Kanamaru, 816 F.2d 624 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
4 See Jones, supra note 3, at 8; see also U.S. Fixation With Patents Hurts TechnologicalProgress,
NIKKEI WKLY, Apr. I I, 1992, at 6.
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Japanese. 45 Jury bias extends to large companies in general. For example,

one survey of Californians eligible for jury duty showed that a majority are
more likely to favor an individual plaintiff over a c6rporate defendant even
before they know anything about the dispute. 46 Japanese companies may
have been targets in recent years because of their economic success. The
Japanese have suggested ways to remove jury bias on technical patent issues. 47 However, negotiations thus far have failed to address this and other
proposals to make the American system of trial by a jury of one's "peers" a
reality for Japanese parties.
C.

The Inabilityof Japaneseand U.S. Courts to ProperlyHandle Patent
Disputes

Most patent harmonization efforts between the U.S. and Japan
concern the administrative law used to obtain a patent grant.48 However,
patent rights have no meaning, and are in fact worthless, if courts are
unwilling to enforce them, or if the courts radically redefine the meaning of
technical claims originally defined by the patent office. Although changes
made so far to the administrative law are a welcome improvement to the
patent law problem, changes in patent enforcement by the courts are
essential to achieve real harmonization.
A new perspective on this problem might be that both Japan and the
U.S. suffer from poor coordination between their courts and patent offices
in the enforcement of patent rights. U.S. inventors and their assigns have
certain expectations of the worth of their Japanese patents because the JPO
makes patent grants with particular claim language. These expectations,
however, are not met when these same claims are interpreted by courts in a
manner that allows others to make near-copies of their inventions. Japanese
inventors, on the other hand, expect their patent rights to be determined in a
fair manner. These expectations are not met when these rights are
45 See generally Jack Lahr, Bias and PrejudiceAgainst Foreign Corporationsin Patent and Other
Technology Jury Trials,2 FED. CIR. BAR J. 405 (1992).
46 Id. at 408 n.8 (the research firm Metricus found that 70% of eligible jurors are likely to favor an
individual over a corporate defendant); see also Stephen Adler, CorporationsFace UphillStruggle in Jury
TrialsInvolving Individuals, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1991, at B2.
47 In 1992 the vice minister of MITI proposed that juries be given their own independent scientific
experts to help them decide matters in patent litigation. MITI Requests U.S. Jury TrialAdvisors, 17 AIPPI
J. 2804 (1992).
8
See Donald Chisum, Introductionto 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV., 437 (Spring 1993) (special issue on
patent law harmonization).
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determined by a jury trial where, in essence, the jurors are peers of their
opponents. Both countries' problems would be reduced if their patent
agencies were more involved in interpreting patent rights during patent
enforcement.

Although a number of commentators have discussed the U.S.-Japan
patent law problem, to date no one has suggested that this problem be

solved by shifting responsibility for patent enforcement from the courts to
the patent agency of each country. Delegating technical issue resolution
during litigation to the patent office in each country is preferable for patent
harmonization for two reasons. First, patent offices are composed of
technical experts who can agree on scientific issues regardless of country of
origin. Second, it is much easier to alter patent office practice by
negotiation than it is to alter court practice.
The theme of judicial disrespect for the technical work product of the
patent agency is common to the problem of weak patents in Japan and to the
problem of jury bias against non-U.S. citizen litigants in the U.S. The
following section examines how Japanese courts fail to utilize the technical
work product of the JPO. This part will propose changes that will increase
the value of Japanese patents by shifting technical patent questions from the
courts to the JPO. Part V then examines the U.S. courts and their disrespect
for the technical work product of the PTO. Finally, Part VI proposes
changes to transfer these technical judgments from the jury to the PTO.
III.

JAPANESE COURTS AND THE WEAK JAPANESE PATENT PROBLEM

In the major industrialized countries of North America and Europe,
patents for fundamental inventions are enforced more broadly against
copiers than patents that are minor variations of previous patents, because
they represent fundamentally new ideas. Fundamental inventions, however,
receive poor protection in Japan because Japanese courts rarely find
infringement. 49
The poor protection of fundamental inventions affects U.S. inventors
and their assigns, in particular, because they tend to patent fundamental inventions and are accustomed to enforcing their rights by litigating them.
Although courts in both the U.S. and Japan interpret technical patent claim
language, patent validity issues are more often litigated in the U.S.
Japanese courts, however, cannot invalidate patents. As a result, defendants
49 See MERGES, supra note 26, at 36.
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in U.S. patent litigation trials often use patent validity as a defense whereas
defendants in Japanese courts may focus more on differences in scope
between claims of the accused technology and the patented technology.
Japanese courts rarely find infringement because they interpret the
technical scope of patent claims so narrowly that it is easy for an infringer
to escape liability by making minor changes to a technology. It is common
for copied inventions to differ in minor, obvious ways when faced with a
patent. Courts apply the "doctrine of equivalents" to reach a holding that a
patent has been infringed in these situations. 50 The doctrine of equivalents
allows the interpretation of a patent claim to encompass not only its literal
meaning but also obvious, minor differences. 5 1 Patents are greatly
weakened when courts are unwilling to utilize the doctrine of equivalents
52
during patent infringement litigation.
While in theory the doctrine of equivalents is part of Japanese law, it
is rarely used.53 This is because Japanese courts apply other doctrines on an
ad hoc basis which precludes the proper application of this doctrine as it is
used in the U.S. or Europe. 54 In particular, Japanese courts most often look
to the patent "specification," or main body of the patent, to limit the scope
of the claim. Various parts of the specification are used to cripple the
meaning of the claim. As a result, courts rarely find infringement.
Japanese courts use a variety of strategies to limit technical claim
scope to details in the specification. First, Japanese courts commonly limit
claims to specific examples disclosed in the "embodiments," or examples
based on the "inventor's recognition theory." 55 Japanese courts thus limit
50 For an explanation of the doctrine of equivalents and its application by Japanese courts, see
DOING BUSINESS, supranote 10, § 2.16[9].
51 Under Japanese court practice, an "equivalence" is recognized only if there is: (1) interchangability; (2) the same function and effect; and (3) the foreseeability of the interchangability by an ordinary
practitioner in the same technical field (obviousness of interchangeability). DOING BUSINESS supra note
10, § 2.1619][a].
52 Even Japanese commentators agree there is a problem with the doctrine of equivalents. For
example, Professor Nobuhiro Nakayama explained that Japanese courts effectively invalidate all or part of
a patent under the pretext of interpreting its scope in order to eliminate improperly granted patents. This is
done because Japanese courts cannot directly invalidate patents. See Nobuhiro Nakayama, Patent
Infringement Suits and Publicly Known Technology, translated in YANAGIDA ET AL., LAW AND

INVESTMENT IN JAPAN 361, 362. (Yanagida Nomura trans., 1994); see also Toshiko Takenaka,
Comparative Study of Patent Claim Interpretation in the United States, Germany and Japan, 17 IIC
STUDIES (forthcoming 1995) (Ph.D. dissertation at 492-93, on file at University of Washington School of
Law); DOING BUSINESS, supranote 10, § 2.16[11-12].
53 Takenaka, supra note 52, at 492-93.
54 Id at 45.
55 Id.
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the scope of the claim to embodiments in the specification based on the
principle that "since the embodiments show the extent of the disclosure or
the subject of what was invented, they indicate the maximum scope of
protection." 56 This theory assumes that the inventor could have recognized
any minor modifications used by the infringer, and is responsible for
including them in the specification.
The 1976 Osaka High Court decision in Art Metal KK v. Hankyu
DepartmentStore5 7 provides an example of this theory in use. In Art Metal,
the claims could be literally interpreted to cover the alleged infringing
device although the accused device differed slightly from the examples in
the patent specification.SS The defendant argued patent invalidity.5 9 The
court found that the accused device was covered under the technical scope
of the claims but further found that the accused device was no different
from the prior art and was entitled to the defense of "the free state of the
art." 60 If this case had been brought in a German court, the court would
have been able to find non-infringement based on the free state of the art. 61
If this case had been brought in a U.S. court, the court would have been free
to directly invalidate the patent.62 The Osaka High Court, however,
disagreed with the use of the free state of the art as a defense because this
would result in "artificial existence of the patent right."63 Instead, the High
Court directed that the technical scope of patent validity only cover the
embodiments in the specification and not any equivalent modifications. 64
In the most cases, it appears that Japanese courts limit patent claims to the
embodiments disclosed in the patent specification.6 5 Consequently, the

56 Id
57 See id at 392 (discussing Judgment of Feb. 10, 1976 (Art Metal K.K. v. Hankyu Dep't Store),
Osaka K6sai [High Court], HANJI, No. 827, Nov. 21, 1976, at 64.
58 Id
59 Id.
60 Id
61 The free state of the art is a doctrine whereby the public is allowed to practice that art which is
known before the patent was applied for. This doctrine allows the defendant to escape liability without
directly addressing the issue of patent validity, which German courts (like their Japanese court cousins) are
not allowed to do. See Bernhard Geissler, Patent Act 1981, Sec. 14: "Moulded Curbstone" (Formstein),
18 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 795 (1987) (discussing No. X ZR 28/85, Decision of the
Federal Supreme Court [Bundesgerichtshof], Apr. 29, 1986) [hereinafter Geissler].
62 Patent technical invalidity issues are a major portion of litigation issues in U.S. courts.
63 Takenaka, supranote 52, at 393.
64 Id. at 393-94.
65 Id. at 394.
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infringement suits is limited to the
scope of the patent claims in most
66
embodiments in the specification.
In addition, Japanese courts limit the claims to particular nuances of
the effects of the invention mentioned in one or more examples in the
specification. In other words, Japanese courts follow an element-byelement analysis of the invention, and decide that a particular effect (even a
minor one) of the invention is an essential element of it. The decision of a
district court in Haga v. Nishifin K.K.6 7 provides a typical example. The
Haga patent covered an apparatus to clean small metal balls used in
pachinko games (a popular game similar to a pin ball machine). The patent
holder charged that another ball washer device was an obvious
infringement. The court, however, did not even address possible structural
68
differences between this mechanical invention and the accused device.
Without even comparing the claim elements with the features of the accused
device, the court looked to the specification and read that one effect of the
69 The accused
invention was to clean all the balls by the game player.
device did not wash all of the balls. Based on this minor difference in the
invention's effect, the court found no infringement. 70 U.S. courts are not
71
allowed to narrow patent scope without addressing patent claim language.
patent interpretation and
U.S. patent holders are not used to such narrow
72
may feel they are being singled out in Japan.
Japanese courts also limit the technical scope of claims to the objectives of the examples provided in the specification. The purpose of these
examples is to help explain the invention to the reader. However, Japanese
courts often will look to the specific "solution principle," or idea utilized by
a particular example, and limit the patent scope to that example's solution
principle, even if that solution pertains to the prior art and not to the invention.73
66 Id at 394-395.
67 See id. at 379-80 (discussing Judgment of June 25, 1975 (Haga v. Nishijin K.K.), Hamamatsu
Chisai6 [District Court], 7 Mutaishii (No. 1) 188).
Id at 383.
69 Id
70 Id
71 Id. at 355; see also Loctite, Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Sjolund v.
Musland, 847 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
72 For a review of technology based examination discrimination, see Harold C. Wegner, Unilateral
Patent Simplification: Domestic Implementing Patent Legislation Under GATT TRIPs, at 15-23 (paper
prepared for a symposium of the Dinwoodey Center, Feb. 16, 1994).
73 Takenaka, supranote 52, at 378.
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For example, in Fujii v. Sanko KK74 a claim to a device for adjusting
the rope of a safety belt included a clasp made from a cover and a pipe into
which a rope was inserted. The court determined the overall purpose of the
invention based on the objective of a prior art, and used this to limit a
particular disputed limitation. 75 The accused device replaced the pipe with
a U-shaped cover. The court found no infringement based on the
interpretation that the term "pipe" in the patent specification did not include
the U-shaped cover. 76 Because the stated purpose of the prior art did not
include the use of a U-shaped cover, the court allowed the infringer to
escape liability based on this narrowing of the patent claim by the object of
the invention. 77 U.S. courts do not narrow patent scope by using the overall
purpose of prior art, as was done here. A U.S. court would have focused on
the function of the disputed element, not the overall purpose of a prior art,
when comparing the element with the accused device. 78 U.S. inventors do
not easily understand such narrowing of patent rights. This makes an
impression that the Japanese patent system is unfair, even though there is no
evidence that U.S. and Japanese patent holders are treated differently from
79
each other.

Moreover, Japanese courts may limit the scope of independent claims
by reference to dependent claims. 80 Claim differentiation into independent
claims and narrower dependent claims never existed in Japan, and the 1987
law which allows multiple patent claims has not been tested in the courts
during infringement litigation. 81 It is possible that the new "multiple claim
system may give Japanese courts another excuse for reading limitations into
a claim" by disregarding broad claims and finding no infringement on the
basis of one of the narrow claims. 82

74 See id. at 375 (discussing Fujii v. Sanko K.K., II Mutaishii (No. 1) 247).
75 Id. at 377.
76 Id.
77

Id

78 Id at 379.
79 See Bruce Stokes, The Culture ofPatents, 20 NAT. J. 1350 (1988) ("A private group of US patent
attorne s concluded after extensive study that the Japanese patent process does not favor Japanese firms.").
8a The scope of an independent claim is interpreted individually. The scope of a dependent claim is
interpreted by reference to a preceding independent claim. Thus, dependent claims are narrower than
independent claims. The independent claims have value, in that if an independent claim is invalid, often its
dependent claim(s) are still valid and can be used (albeit narrowly) against others.
81 The 1987 revision to the Patent Law allows multiple claims and wide invention in one application.
Takenaka, supranote 52, at 425.
82 Id. at 427.
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Finally, Japanese courts frequently find broad fundamental claims to
be vague. When this happens, they limit the meaning of the claims to
83
particular features of examples disclosed in the specification. As a result,
basic inventions which are expressed using broad claim language receive
less protection. This is a problem when the patentee has expressed her
invention using "means plus function" language in which a broad claim is
84
expressed as (any) means to produce a particular function. Means plus
function language is useful to describe fundamental inventions because an
element of the invention can be made by many different means. Therefore,
it is convenient to describe the element as a means to achieve the function.
The court's holding in the Fuji KK v. Risa KK 85 utility model
patent litigation is an example of a broad patent claim that was limited to a
specific example. In Fuji, the claim cited a door knob cover comprising a
cloth (outer layer) and a polyurethane foam "being fixed on the cloth" in
which the foam covers the knob. 86 The specification included one example
in which the foam was glued to the cloth. The accused device had exactly
the same features as the example except that the foam was not glued, but
held in place by its placement between the cloth and the doorknob. To
resolve a dispute over the meaning of "fixed on," the court stated that the
example given did not show use of the cover without glue and so "fixed on"
meant fixed on before placing the cover on the doorknob with a rubber
band. 87 U.S. courts would probably not have limited the term "fixed on" in
this manner. 88 Patent applicants in fact use broad terms like "fixed on" 8to9
denote wider meanings when petitioning a patent office for patent rights.
If the JPO finds a proposed claim's meaning to be too broad or ambiguous it
forces the applicant to adopt a narrower meaning. The courts respect and
utilize the history of patent examination analysis when such history
supports a narrow patent scope. In such a case, the court looks to the
correspondence between the patent applicant and the JPO during
prosecution. 90 It is thus unsettling to U.S. holders of Japanese patents when
83 Id at 395; see also DOING BUSINESS, supranote 10, § 2.16 [4].
84 Takenaka, supranote 52, at 409-10.
85 See id at 399 (discussing Judgment of Feb. 16, 1983 (Fuji K.K. v. Risa K.K.), Tokyo Chisai
[District Court], 15 Mutaishii (No. 1) 49).
86 Id.
87 Id at 400.
88 Id at401 & n.65.
89 Id at401
90 DOING BUSINESS, supra note 10, § 2.16[6].
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the courts do not similarly respect the decisions of the JPO to go the other
way and allow broader claim language. 9 1
Foreigners find it difficult to understand these Japanese court
decisions. Japanese courts' interpretation of patent technical scope differs so
much from the interpretation of claims allowed by the JPO during patent
prosecution. It is common practice in all major patent systems that a patent

applicant present examples in the specification to teach the invention. The
claims are commonly written broad enough to include more than the
specific examples given. If the courts could interpret patent claims in a
manner consistent with their interpretation by the patent office there would
be more legal certainty over the exact meaning of the patent.
The disjuncture in patent scope interpretation between the Japanese
courts and the JPO began in 1959, when the responsibility for deciding
patent infringement was transferred from the JPO to the courts.92 Before
1959, the JPO had exclusive responsibility for judging infringement and for
declaring patents invalid. The JPO used the same standard for interpreting
the scope of patents in both granting the patent and in determining
infringement. According to one Japanese scholar, when the responsibility
for deciding infringement was transferred to the courts by the Patent Act of
1959, the courts removed the doctrine of equivalents and instituted the "all
elements rule" of the U.S. 93 This created a disjuncture between the standard
for patentability and the standard for protection scope. 94 Therefore,
beginning in 1959, the JPO used one standard for giving patent protection
for inventions. The courts used a different standard for enforcing these
rights. This lack of coordination between the JPO and the courts
contributes to the appearance of weak patents, since patentees and other
interested parties cannot rely on the JPO's interpretation of patent rights. 95
91 See id. (discussing Judgment of Feb. 15, 1974 (Yoshinaga Prince K.K. v. K.K. Maruman [Flint
Igniter Case]), Tokyo Chisai [District Court], 1974 Torikeshi Shil 79, and Judgment of Apr. 20, 1973
(Badische Anilin Und Soda Fabrikes A.G. v. Sanwa Kasei Kogyo K.K. [Foaming Agent Case]), Tokyo
Chisai [District Court], 1973 Torikeshi Shfi 75).
92 See DOING BUSINESS, supra note 10, § 1.06[2].

93 Takenaka, supra note 52, at 91-92.
94 id at 93.
95 The argument that the JPO would also interpret Japanese patents narrowly as the courts do, has
some validity, but is flawed. It is true that even before 1959, under the "inventor's recognition theory" the
JPO also construed patent rights very narrowly. However, the JPO has changed greatly in recent years.
For example, multiple claim practice has been instituted, and a significant effort has been made to force
Japanese companies to file broader and more significant (but fewer) patent applications. See Fumitake
Yoshida, Harmonizationof PatentSystems, AIPPI J., Mar. 1990, at 61-62. Thus, although the JPO had a
restrictive approach to claim interpretation in the distant past, it has since changed in step with patent
systems of other industrialized countries.
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The lack of coordination between the courts and the JPO is
responsible for much of the overly narrow judicial interpretations of
Japanese patents. One reason for this problem is that the JPO and the courts
function very differently, yet both decide technical issues of patent validity
for the same patent rights. A second reason is that the JPO alone has the
power to invalidate improperly granted patents, yet the courts alone have
96
the power to interpret these same patents during infringement litigation.
The courts, therefore, are in a quandary when faced with a questionable
patent. They have to avoid infringement holdings to achieve justice, and do
so by interpreting the occasional patent very narrowly on an ad-hoc basis.
Thus, oftentimes a court has no option but to interpret patent claims very
narrowly by using one or more of the tactics mentioned above in order to
achieve justice. 97 This practice is widespread and may be the major cause
98
of the appearance of weak patents in Japan.

The Supreme Court of Japan acknowledged and approved this

practice in the Truck Case.99 In Truck, a patent covered a device for
preventing derailment of a train car. The Tokyo High Court interpreted the
meaning of "having a gap sufficient for free movement between the wheel's
shaft and its support" as meaning free movement up and down as well as
sideways.'OO The alleged infringing device allowed free movement up and
down only in a manner already shown by the prior art.101 The court found
96 It could be argued that few Japanese patents are actually improperly granted. This is because
business competitors have the opportunity to help the JPO find prior art that would invalidate the patent
before its granting, via the opposition procedure. The United States, on the other hand, seems to rely more
on the duty of the applicant to disclose all known relevant prior art. 37 C.F.R. § 1.55 (1994).
97 This situation is more common than might be expected because any publication anywhere in the
world (in any language) that describes the invention or makes it obvious invalidates the invention. It seems
nearly impossible for a patent office to consider everything that was ever published in the world while
evaluating each patent application. As a result, new "prior art" often surfaces during the public opposition
period and sometimes later. Other reasons may exist to find a patent invalid: For example, when the
owner obtained it improperly or used the invention publicly before applying for a patent. The U.S. patent
system partly addresses this problem by requiring all applicants to disclose all related publications when
filing a patent application. See Harold C. Wegner, Inequitable Conduct and the ProperRules of Patent
Attorney and Examiner in an Era of InternationalPatentHarmonization,16 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N
Q.J. 38, 52-54 (1988).
98 Approximately half of all patents that are used in infringement proceedings are considered invalid
by the judges who oversee these trials. Because patent invalidation trials at the JPO are even slower than
patent infringement trials in the courts, the courts have no option but to find non-infringement by an
indirect means. Interview with Osamu Takura, former Judge, Tokyo High Court, in Seattle, WA (Oct. 23,
1993) 9iereinafter Takura interview].
9T See DOING BUSINESS, supranote 10, § 2.16[5] (discussing Judgment of Dec. 7, 1962 (Okabe K.K.
v. Hitachi Seisakujo K.K. [Truck Case]), Saik6sai [Supreme Court], 16 Minshil 2321.
100 Id
101 d
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no infringement. The verdict was appealed to the Supreme Court which
sustained the Tokyo High Court, stating:
The alleged infringer cannot raise a validity issue here as to
whether the contents of the patent are publicly known or not.
However, in considering for what invention the patent was
granted, it is impossible to neglect the level of technical skill at
the time of filing of the patent .... Such being the case, there
is no other way to interpretthe invention except in the narrow
02
wayfound by the Tokyo High Court.(emphasis added).1

Seen from the viewpoint of the Supreme Court, the case by case
application of a narrow patent scope interpretation is sometimes necessary
to achieve equity in the enforcement of patents. As long as patents of
questionable validity are litigated in Japanese courts, the courts will
interpret them narrowly. Furthermore, the practice of ovemarrow claim
interpretation by the courts is probably extended to claims of patents whose
validity is not in question. Thus, the case by case application of narrow
patent scope interpretation is a general problem affecting all patent holders.
The reluctance of Japanese courts to use the doctrine of equivalents
continues. An example is the Pulpwood Barking Machine Case. 03 In-

fringement was found in this case, and although the Supreme Court
mentioned the doctrine of equivalents, it did not apply it in the way an
American or German court would have. I04 Furthermore, the facts of this
case show how willing the courts are to accommodate copiers of
inventions. 105 The Pulpwood Barking Machine patent claim language
granted by the JPO was unusually narrow, there was no doubt that it did not
encompass prior art, and the difference between the patented invention and
the infringing device was very minor and unusually obvious.10 6 It has even
been argued that this case was such an obvious example of piracy that it
would not have gone to trial in the U.S. or Germany. 107 It seems that the
reluctance of Japanese courts to enforce patents may have encouraged the
102 Id
103 See Takenaka, supranote 52, at 480 (discussing Judgment of May 29, 1988 (Pulpwood Barking
Machine Case), Saik6sai [Supreme Court], JURISTO, No. 903, Mar. 1, 1988, at 85.
104 Id at 480.
105 Id at 484-85.
106 Id at 484.
107 Id at 485.
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infringer to litigate with the patent holder instead of settling out of court, as
one probably would have done in the U.S.108
It has been recently argued that Japanese courts are interpreting
Japanese patents more broadly.109 In 1994, The Tokyo High Court
overturned a decision of the Tokyo District Court in which no infringement
had been found. Although the Tokyo High Court did not employ the term
"doctrine of equivalents" or "equivalent," it expanded the scope of
protection beyond the literal claim language. 1 0 This apparent shift in the
Tokyo High Court's attitude towards greater protection of inventions is
welcome. However, the broader interpretation of patent claims by Japanese
courts does not address the underlying problem of inconsistent application
of laws to intellectual property rights. As long as courts faced with invalid
patents are unable to declare such patents invalid, they will continue to
apply inconsistent legal doctrines on an ad-hoc basis. Patent claims will
continue to remain unreliable and patent rights will be weak because the
public will not be able to trust patent claim language.
The creative ad hoc interpretation of a patent's technical scope based
on statements made in the specification often contradicts the patent scope
meaning determined by the JPO. This failure to rely on the patent claim
hurts the public and business partners of patentees by putting the jury "to
Although the ostensible goal of Japanese
sea without guiding charts."'
courts is legal certainty, the inconsistent application of the doctrine of
equivalents leads to unpredictable results.
IV.

SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF WEAK JAPANESE PATENTS

The relative weakness of Japanese patents results from the narrow
interpretation given to the scope of patents by Japanese courts. This
problem could be solved by formally or informally shifting responsibility
for technical patent scope interpretation to the JPO, or it could be solved by
108 In a more recent case the scope of a biotech patent claim was not extended to a minor modification of an obvious chemical substance. See David Swinbanks, Roche Loses Round in Interferon Patent
Battle,368 NATURE 486 (1994).
109 Shoichi Okuyama, Latest Developments inJapanese IP Cases: THK Co., Ltd.v. Tsubakimoto
Precision Prods. Co., Ltd, 19 AIPPI J. 240, 242 (1994). In this case, the Tokyo High Court overturned a
decision of the Tokyo District Court based on a broad interpretation of a patent claim. This case has
apparently been appealed to the Japanese Supreme Court. Id
110 Id.
111 Malta v. Schumerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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adopting of policies for wider patent claim

Timely Reexamination of Patents by the JPO at the Beginning of
Litigation

Parties to a patent lawsuit should petition the JPO to reexamine the
affected patent and to issue an advisory opinion on patent scope.ll 2 More
importantly, the JPO should change its procedures to conduct such
determinations with utmost dispatch. Doing so would bring the JPO's
technical expertise to bear on patent infringement issues early in a patent infringement suit. The JPO should be involved for the additional reason that
patent claims are created at the patent office, which is ultimately responsible
for determining what they mean. The JPO has the power to invalidate
patents anytime after their issuance. Moreover, a court's assistance is not
needed or allowed during this administrative procedure. If there is a
problem or mistake in the JPO's intended meaning of claim language, the
JPO should have the first chance to clear up ambiguities since the JPO was
created for this task and already has a procedure for handling these requests
13
from interested parties.1
Japanese courts cannot make direct requests of government agencies
anytime they are unsure of the language of documents made by such
agencies, or when they think the agency made a mistake. 1 4 An obvious
solution to the uncertainty of validity and technical scope of patents
involved in litigation is for one of the litigants to request the JPO to
reexamine the patent, and make a binding decision on its technical validity,
and to request the JPO make a helpful suggestion about the scope of the
patent. If the patent is invalid the suit can be terminated at an early stage
and, if valid, the agency's explanation of why it is valid and its
112 Non-binding interpretations of patent scope, called hantei, are sometimes done now under

Patent Law § 71. Patent validity can always be challenged under Patent Law § 123. Patent Law §§ 71,
123, in JAPANESE LAWS, supranote 7.
113 Id
114 The Japanese judicial system is independent of the executive branch of government. In 1959,
the power of the JPO was severely curtailed when it lost its exclusive right to interpret the scope of patent
claims during litigation. Instead, this procedure, called "hantei ' became non-binding on the courts. This
loss in power to determine patent claim scope is regrettable because as a result, a schism was created
between the standard used to determine patent claim scope during patent application examination and
patent claim scope during patent enforcement. The Japanese courts use a different standard than the JPO.
See DOING BUSINESS, supranote 10, § 1.06[2].
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interpretation of claims would be available to the court. 115 This suggestion
should not be, confused with the past practice wherein requesting a binding
patent scope certification trial was a prerequisite to filing an infringement
case with a court.
Legally interested parties already have the right to ask the JPO for a
patent invalidity trial under the patent statutes. The real issue, therefore, is
why the technical expertise of the JPO is not used to settle the invalidity
question for patents used in infringement litigation. Japanese courts are
willing to suspend litigation if it seems that the JPO may make an important
decision concerning a litigated patent. 116 The reason for the problem is that
it usually takes longer for the JPO to make a decision concerning an issued
patent and to appeal this decision than it does to hold an infringement
trial.1 17 Since trials tend to last a long time, the parties are usually looking
for ways to settle out of court. To encourage settlement, the court could call
on the timely advice of the JPO. Moreover, technical determinations of
patent scope and infringement (hantei)by the JPO, while not binding on the
court, would help simplify the court's task of comparing patented with nonpatented technology. Therefore, speeding up invalidation trials at the JPO
through the appeals stage would most effectively cure this problem.
Courts should suggest to one or both parties involved in patent litigation to petition the JPO for: 1) a binding invalidation trial and 2) a nonbinding official interpretation (hantei)."S This suggestion could be
implemented by incorporating this requirement into the pleading procedure.
Specifically, the request could be a prerequisite to the presumption of
willfulness at the time of filing a lawsuit. The plaintiff in an infringement
lawsuit often sends a warning letter to the defendant before instituting legal
proceedings. The sending of this warning letter is encouraged to establish
willfulness on the part of the infringer."19 A plaintiff's request to the JPO
for a hantei should be encouraged to show a good faith belief that the patent
has been infringed. Analogously, a defendant's request to the JPO for an
invalidation of the patent ghould be encouraged as a means of providing
evidence to the court. Such requests would be inconvenient to both sides.
115 Id. §2.13[I][i].
116 Id
117 Although requests to the JPO for an invalidity trial usually are made at the same time as the
initiation of infringement litigation, the litigation is usually over before the JPO makes a decision. Takura
interview, supra note 98.
118 Patent Law § 71, in JAPANESE LAWS, supranote 7.
119 See DOING BuSINESS, supranote 10, § 2.18[l].
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However, much could be gained if the court could use the JPO's findings of
patent validity because the court cannot make such judgments itself. This is
particularly true given the duration time of Japanese patent litigation. 120
Another indirect means to encourage the parties to petition the JPO
before initiating litigation would be for the Japan Patent Association to
adopt a policy that its members petition the JPO for patent invalidity and
infringement determinations before filing or responding to infringement
suits. This is the kind of policy that falls within the domain of a trade
organization. It is similar to alternative dispute resolution that has become
popular in the U.S. with companies that are weary of excess litigation.121
By encouraging companies to petition the JPO, they could avoid relying on a court system which often applies legal doctrine unevenly. As a
rule, courts in Japan interpret patents unusually narrowly on a case by case
basis to cope with the problem of improperly granted patents. If the
technical validity of apatent were reexamined early in litigation, improperly
granted patents could be invalidated by the JPO. Thus, courts would no
longer be in the difficult position of having to interpret patent claims
unusually narrowly in order to avoid finding infringement of improperly
granted patents. This would have the indirect effect of freeing the courts to
apply a doctrine of equivalents in patent litigation, and foreign patent
holders would not feel as victimized by unreasonable interpretations of
valid patents during infringement litigation.
Giving a "friend of the court" power to the JPO would not defeat the
purpose of the 1959 patent reorganization law which transferred the power
of determining patent infringement from the JPO to the courts. By requiring
the JPO to give its technical input to the court at the beginning of a dispute
the courts can continue to safeguard patent rights. Only purely technical
aspects of patent claim determination would be requested from the JPO.
Courts would still be free to find infringement and look at various kinds of
misconduct. Moreover, the proposed change would not substantively differ
over current practice because any legally interested party has the right to
petition the JPO (and many do so). The courts should welcome technical
120 See Meller, supranote 20, at 112.
121 More than 600 companies and 150 law firms in the United States have pledged to the Center for
Public Resources (the national ADR coordinating body) that they will consider forms of ADR before going
to court against other signers. See James P. O'Shaughnessy, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Effective
Tool to ProtectIntellectual Property, LAW WORKS, Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 18. Likewise, bringing commonly
litigated issues such as patent validity and technical scope to the patent office could bring down costs for
companies that prefer to spend money on factories and R&D instead of legal services.
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input from the JPO. This would allow them to focus on equitable concerns
such as good faith conduct on the part of infringers.
Under the proposed changes, regular district courts in Japan would be
less likely to interfere with government agencies such as the JPO. The
courts now already interfere with the JPO's work by indirectly invalidating
patents when they refuse to use the doctrine of equivalents and interpret
patent claims unusually narrowly. If one or more parties were required to
petition the JPO for a hantei or invalidation trial before bringing their
dispute to a court, the present relationship between the courts and the JPO
would be respected more. One of the functions of the court is to hear
evidence. The JPO is the best source for evidence and expert opinions
concerning its own work product.
Of course, the key to making this suggestion work is getting the JPO
to respond to official interpretation and invalidation requests in a timely
manner. The JPO already has a fast examination request procedure for
applicants who want an early examination of their applications. The JPO
has also made remarkable strides in streamlining the procedure to examine
patent applications rapidly.122 If the JPO made pre-litigation requests the
highest priority, it could handle these requests quickly, especially since the
JPO is already familiar with the patents involved.
The biggest problem is the time the JPO takes to conduct invalidity
trials. If JPO invalidation trial results were rendered quickly, they would
significantly assist . resolution of the situation in a non-threatening
manner. 123 JPO invalidation decisions are binding on the courts and can be
24 It is important
appealed by the losing party to the Tokyo High Court.'
that such appeals from invalidation judgments also be conducted with the
utmost dispatch by the high court. A rapid response by the JPO would be
helpful even during litigation because an infringement court will usually
exercise its right to stay the infringement proceedings if the request for
125 Since
invalidation goes to the appeals stage at the Tokyo High Court.
the best solution
invalidation trials last longer than infringement trials,
12 6
trials.
infringement
these
up
might be to greatly speed
122 Monya, supra note 5, at 229 & nn.6-8. Steps taken by the JPO include increasing the JPO staff,
using an examination investigator system, adopting a paperless system, commissioning outside organizations to research prior art, and improving management of the number of patent applications.
123 Takura interview, supranote 98.
124 Patent Law § 178; Utility Model Law § 41, in JAPANESE LAWS, supranote 7.
125 DOING BUSINESS,supra note 10, § 2.13[I][i].
126 Takura interview, supranote 98.
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Adoption of German Court Doctrine to Recognize Wider Patent
Scope

An alternative solution is for Japanese courts to adopt German legal
doctrines used to enforce strong patents. Many similarities exist between
the German civil code system and the Japanese civil code system with
respect to patent law.' 27 In both systems, district courts are not allowed to
invalidate patents.12 8 More importantly, both systems previously used the
judicial "inventor's limitation theory," to interpret patent protection scope
during litigation. According to the "inventors limitation theory" an inventor
is responsible for knowing what form his invention can take. He has the
right to explain these forms in his patent specification and is limited to what
he recognizes to be his invention. German courts noted the flaw in the
inventor's limitation theory and replaced it with the "expansion theory" on
the basis that it was more realistic.1 29 The "expansion theory" allows the
invention to be expanded to new uses or embodiments of the invention that
may not have been conceived by the inventor, possibly because other
developments in technology had not been made at the time of filing the
patent application. Japanese courts should similarly replace the Japanese
inventor's recognition theory with a new theory that extends patent
protection to modifications of the invention. This would allow Japanese
patents to be enforced more often against copycat infringers because most
infringers include slight modifications to the patented invention.
Although in principle Japanese courts rely on claim language to
determine patent scope, in reality the claims are usually severely limited by
details of the patent specification. This hurts the patentee and the public
who need to rely on the patent claims to understand the limits to patent
property rights. Ideally, the JPO, the courts and the public should all have
the same understanding as to what the patent property rights are. It follows
that Japanese courts should use the same test for infringement as used by
the JPO when it decided to grant the patent.
Like present day Japanese courts, German courts formerly relied primarily on the patent specification and not the claims in determining patent
127 Japan's patent law is modeled after the German patent law. In particular, Japanese patent scope
is modelled after German principles. For a discussion of this topic, see Takenaka, supra note 52, at 9, 7787.
128

For a discussion of the Japanese system, see Wachter, supranote 17, at 63-67.

129 Takenaka, supra note 52, at 454.
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scope. This practice was abolished and replaced with the defense of the
"free state of the art" in the Molded Curbstone Case.130 In this case, the
German Supreme Court decided that concepts such as "principle of
invention" and the "nature of the problem being solved," as determined
from the patent specification, are not the primary tests to be used for
determining patent infringement. Instead, the German court allowed the
defense that the infringing embodiment alleged to be an equivalent would
not be patentable over the prior art.
This case affirmed and extended German patent law doctrine whereby
patent claims are not merely the starting point but, rather, the essential basis
for the determination of patent scope. 131 The German district courts, like
their Japanese counterparts, cannot invalidate a patent. The German
Supreme Court solved this problem by allowing the district court, in effect,
to indirectly invalidate patents by examining the alleged infringing
embodiment as if it were a patent application. The alleged infringing
embodiment can then be declared unpatentable over the prior art. However,
the rule established by the Molded Curbstone Case is only applicable to
limit the range of equivalents and does not allow a court to find noninfringement when literal infringement (such as exact copying of an
invention) exists. This is a limitation on the defense of the free state of the
art.
If Japanese courts were to develop the defense of the free state of the
art as interpreted in the Molded Curbstone Case, they would have to extend
it to literal infringements and make judgments that touch upon the validity
of patent claims. The Osaka District Court, in essence, did this in the
Woven Basket Case.132 This case concerned a woven basket having
particular construction characteristics. During a patent infringement trial,
the Court found that all of the elements claimed in the utility model patent
were public knowledge before the patent application was filed. The court
admitted that it did not have the power to deny the patent's validity but
dismissed the action for damages, holding:
130 See Geissler, supranote 61, at 795. The principle of the free state ofthe art is that everyone has
the right to use technology that is free and already publicly known. This principle became a defense for
defendants charged with patent infringement who are using technology that was already in the public
domain.
131 Id at798.
132 See DOING BUSINESs, supra note 10, § 2.16[5] (discussing Judgment of Apr. 17, 1970 (Art
Metal K.K. v. Fukai Kinzoker K6gy5 K.K. [Woven Basket Case]), Osaka Chisai [District Court], 2
Mutaishfil 151).
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Those techniques which are publicly known or have been used
are in the public domain. The utility model contains nothing
more than what is already in the public domain. The products
of the defendant are exactly the same as those described in the
cited prior art literature. It should not be permissible to restrict
the use of techniques already in the public domain. Therefore,
the plaintiff shall not be allowed to exercise its right against the
33
defendant.1
This holding is analogous to the use of the defense of the free state of
the art in Germany to allow a defendant to escape an infringement holding
because the defendant's technology was public knowledge at the time the
plaintiff applied for his patent. It is unfortunate that this approach was
denied at the appellate level. 134
If the Japanese courts were free to use the reasoning of the Osaka
District Court in the Woven Basket Case they would not have to interpret

patent claim scope very narrowly on a case-by-case basis in order to achieve
justice. Courts could then more consistently and broadly interpret patent
claims. This would improve the reliability of Japanese patents and would
therefore eliminate much of the U.S.-Japan patent friction.
Allowing courts to determine the validity of infringing embodiments
over the prior art would not really shift power away from the JPO to the
courts. Currently, only the JPO can declare technology patentable over the
prior art or declare a patent claim invalid. To give some of this power to the

courts might seem to violate the distribution of authority between the JPO
and the courts. However, such court decisions would not apply to other
claims and the patent could still be enforced against these. Furthermore, the
courts are already making Japanese patent rights uncertain by interpreting
them very narrowly on a case-by-case basis. Indirectly therefore, they have

already taken power away from the JPO. By following the German
precedent, the Japanese courts' actions which indirectly invalidate patent
claims would simply be more transparent and consistent. As a result,
patentees and the public would be more certain about Japanese patent rights
and foreigners would feel less victimized by what seems to be a random
case-by-case process.
133 Id.
134 Id.
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Expand the Scope of Patent Correction Trials to Allow the JPO to
Administer the Doctrineof Equivalents

The JPO already reinterprets patent claim scope after a patent's grant
and this power could be expanded to cover infringing equivalents of the invention. Patent correction trials can be requested in which the claim of an
issued patent can be narrowed (for example to avoid prior art), errors can be
corrected, and ambiguity can be clarified. Correction trials have the
potential to clarify patent scope issues so that patents could be less
ambiguously enforced against infringers. For example, during a correction
trial, the patentee could restate what he intends the scope of his patent to be
(after learning about an infringer) and the JPO could modify the patent
claim language. 135 However, under current law, a Japanese patent claim can
not be enlarged this way, even if the enlarged claim was supported in the
136
original application.
If the scope of patent correction by the JPO could be widened to
allow broadening of a claim to cover an infringer's activities after they were
discovered, but before the filing of an infringement suit against her, then
37
This is
these proceedings could function as a doctrine of equivalents.1
similar in both function and effect to the use of continuation practice in the
U.S. PTO to re-draft a claim broad enough to ensnare infringers after
discovery of infringement. 138 It is also similar to U.S. re-issue practice (in
the PTO) in which a patentee can seek a wider claim up to two years after
135 Other courts have found this activity (i.e. change to patent claims to cover an infringer's device)
to be equitable. For example the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated in 1988: "[N]or is it in
any manner improper to amend or insert claims intended to cover a competitor's product the applicant's
attorney has learned about during the prosecution of a patent application." Kingsdown Medical
Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied,490 U.S. 1067 (1989).
136 DOING BUSINESS, supra note 10, § 2.1312].
137 Replacement of the judicial doctrine of equivalents by this administrative procedure was proposed for the U.S. patent system. This might be easier for the U.S. patent system than for the Japanese
patent system however because the scope of U.S. patent claims can be broadened by correction up to two
years after their granting. See generally Adelman & Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent
Law: Questions thatPennwalt DidNot Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 711-29 (1989).
138 See, e.g., Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed. Cir.
1988), cert. denied,490 U.S. 1067 (1989). The Kingsdown Court declared:
[There is nothing improper, illegal or inequitable in filing a patent application for the purpose
of obtaining a right to exclude a known competitor's product from the marketplace; nor is it in
any manner improper to amend or insert claims intended to cover a competitor's product the
applicant's attorney has learned about during the prosecution of a patent application.
Id at 874.
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the grant of his patent.139 However, this procedure would not be acceptable
in Japan unless the general public is given the right to challenge a claim that
had been broadened by an opposition proceeding. Otherwise an applicant
could escape public review of a patent application claim by prosecuting her
application with a narrow claim(s) through opposition and then widening
the claim(s) later in an ex parte patent correction trial proceeding. This
suggestion would therefore require changing Japan's patent statutes in two
ways. One way would be to allow the widening of a patent claim by a
correction trial. The second would be to subject a widened claim to the
same interference proceeding as is used for the de novo granting of a patent
claim.
The major problem with this third proposal may be that a patent claim

would be less certain because of the potential to change it. However, a
Japanese patent claim is already interpreted on a case-by-case basis. Thus,
the proposal would not make a patent claim less certain than it already is.
Of the three proposed solutions, the first (timely reexamination of
patents at the beginning of litigation) is probably the most easily
implemented. The JPO has drastically improved its procedures for the
reexamination of patents and this should greatly decrease the pendency of
patents being examined by the PTO. 140 If the JPO similarly conducted
patent invalidity trials for patents involved in litigation, it could eliminate
these patents from further litigation and also allow the courts to more
predictably enforce patents which the courts feel are valid. 14 1
The second proposed solution (adoption of German court doctrine)
would improve the disposition of patent suits by giving courts the freedom
to use the defense of the free state of the art to eliminate invalid patents.
This solution is feasible because the Japanese lower courts have some
experience with it already. 142 The third proposed solution (to let the JPO
reexamine and grant broader claim(s) to a patent after it is granted) would
essentially transfer responsibility for determining equivalents of a patented
technology from the courts to the patent office. This would run counter to
the trend in Japanese law of giving more power to the courts and is
therefore probably unacceptable. 143
139
140
141
142
143

35 U.S.C. §251 (1988).
See Monya, supranote 5, at 231-37.
Takura interview, supranote 98.
See DOING BUSINESS, supra note 10, § 2.1615] (discussing Woven Basket Case).
See Takenaka, supranote 52, at 480 (discussing Pulpwood Barking Machine Case).
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U.S. COURTS AND THE EXCESSIVE LITIGATION PROBLEM

Frequent and costly litigation of U.S. patents is a major problem not
only to Japanese inventors and their assigns but to U.S. citizens. Unlike
other major patent systems which employ a public opposition procedure,
litigation is the principal route whereby others challenge the validity of U.S.
patents. Technical issues of patent validity are commonly contested in these
suits. Furthermore, juries are increasingly being used to evaluate technical
patent validity questions because of the greater chance of proving a patent
valid. 144 This is a problem for Japanese defendants who feel that Americans
are biased against' non-U.S. companies and that jury verdicts often reflect
this bias. The perceptions of the Japanese are aggravated when virtually all
acts of the PTO, including purely technical decisions, are reviewed by
American juries and judges. U.S. District Court judges often do not have an
understanding of the technical issues involved until they are well into the
patent trial. 145 Keeping technical decisions in the technical administrative
agency created specifically for their resolution would remove this disparity
and alleviate much of the U.S.-Japan patent friction. Thus, the solution to
the patent enforcement problem for foreign litigants lies in properly
balancing the shared responsibility for patent rights between the courts and
the PTO.
Congress took a step towards reducing costs when it passed the 1980
Reexamination Act.146 A purpose of this statute was to allow reexamination
of patent validity in an impartial forum at one hundred times less cost, and
14 7
If reto give greater certainty to a patent holder and its financial backers.
examination could be done by the PTO instead of by trial, a large portion of
patent litigation would be unnecessary because about half of all patent
litigation concerns technical validity issues.148 This would eliminate much
144 See Roy E. Hofer, The Obviousness Issue: The Jury takes over!, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.

Soc'Y 107 (1989); John B. Pegram, Patent Jury Actions: Winning for the Defendant, 71 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 493 (1989).
145 Victor G. Savikas, Survey Lets Judges RenderSome Opinions About the PatentBar NAT'L L.J.,
Jan. 18, 1993, at S7. Savikas surveyed over 700 U.S. District Court judges and found that 41% felt that
patent cases should be tried in a special patent court. Thirty-nine percent also felt that patent cases are too
difficult to be tried by jury. Id
146 H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.l, at 4 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6460, 6463. Reexamination was meant to allow both patent holders and challengers to avoid the high costs
and delays of patent litigation.
148 d

148 ld
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of the bad feelings that Japanese have about the U.S. patent enforcement
system.
A.

The 1980 U.S. Patent Reexamination Statute Does Not Go Far
Enough

U.S. patent litigants have been searching for non-litigious solutions to
confirm patent validity for many years. For example, in the 1970s many
patent holders sought "no defect" reissue patents outside the scope of the
reissue statute. By asking the PTO to reissue their patents, the patentees
could be more sure of the strength of their patents. In 1977, the "Dann
Amendments"' 149 formalized this process and allowed interested parties to
submit adverse information and challenge the reissue seeker by a quasi inter
partes proceeding.150 One problem with this solution was that patent
owners who sought a reissue often discovered that an ex parte proceeding
could turn into an inter partes procedure where all issues of validity,
including fraud could be raised. The protracted reissue proceedings
available under the Dann Amendments were finally abolished by repeal of
the amendments in 1982.151 However, the need to re-examine patent
validity remained.
The experience with the Dann amendments indicates that proper reexamination requires a good balance of inter partes procedure and ex partes
procedure. Courts can judge demeanor testimony and are best suited for
inter partes proceedings. The PTO can decide technical issues and is best
suited for ex parte proceedings. Both demeanor testimony and technical
issue resolution are needed for re-examination of patent validity and,
therefore, under the present U.S. system both the courts and the PTO should
play a role.
The major purpose of the 1980 Reexamination Act was to strengthen
issued U.S. patents and make their validity more certain, although the
effects on the rights of non-U.S. citizens was not a concern. 152 In particular,
Congress was concerned about the effects of litigating patent validity on the
financial health of American companies. Congress felt that the PTO could
149 From 1977 to 1982, the so-called "Dann Amendments" were in effect, allowing public access to
reissue~roceedings.
150 See, e.g., Henkel Corp. v. Coral, Inc., 754 F.Supp. 1280, 1294 (N.D. III. 1990).
151 J.P. Stevens v. Lex Tex, 747 F.2d 1553, 1558 & n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

152 H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.1, at 4 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6460, 6463.
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reexamine patent validity for one hundredth the cost of the courts and that
about 2000 patents would be reexamined each year.153 Since about 1400
patents per year are still litigated, statutory reexamination has not been a solution to the expensive litigation problem which affects U.S. companies as
well as Japanese companies because more U.S. companies are involved in
litigation.154
Statutory reexamination has great potential to assist the courts in
deciding technical matters being litigated. Today, reexamination results, if
available, are given great deference by courts and juries who realize their
own limitations in understanding advanced technology. Courts will often
stay proceedings to wait for reexamination that can lead to "simplification
of litigation that might result from the cancellation, clarification, or
limitation of claims," 155 and which can "provide valuable analysis... ." 156
B.

StatutoryReexamination of U.S. Patents and its Shortcomings

Statutory reexamination has not significantly eliminated the patent
litigation problem which affects U.S. citizens and Japanese alike because: 1)
its scope is too narrow; 2) it is not mandatory and integrated well into
litigation practice; and 3) reexamination does not allow the non-patentee
requester the right to rebut arguments made by the patentee.
1.

The Scope is Too Narrow.

Only a few technical patent validity issues can be reexamined by the
PTO. I5 7 Unlike in the Japanese opposition-based reexamination procedure,
a requester can only show patents and publications relating to novelty and
153 Id.
154 In the twelve months ending June 30, 1992, 1,407 patent cases were heard in district courts.
Fifty one percent of these were by jury trial. Forty-one percent of the judges queried believed that patent
cases should be tried to a special patent court established for that purpose. Seventy percent of the judges
said that they never appoint special masters, and twenty-five percent said they rarely do. Less than one
percent of the judges who responded to the poll said they routinely appoint experts to assist the court. This
situation is quite different from that in Europe where special courts comprised of technically trained judges
and special masters trained in technology hear invalidation trials. This situation is also quite different from
that of the PTO which uses only technically trained examiners to determine patent validity issues. Savikas,
supranote 145, at S7.
155 Ethicon v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
156 Id
157 35 U.S.C. § 302 (1988).
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non-obviousness issues to the PTO.158 Patent specification issues such as
enablement of claims (complete explanation of how to make and use the
invention) from the specification are not reexamined except when new or
amended claims are presented.159
Determining whether a patent
specification supports claim language seems to be just the sort of technical
issue that the PTO was established to address. However, court litigation is
still the exclusive route for reexamination of these technical questions.
Japanese patentees are used to having the JPO examine these questions and
other technical issues for Japanese patents. However, they are forced to
become embroiled in litigation when dealing with these same issues in the
U.S.
On the other hand, patent reexamination by the PTO should be
limited to technical issues that do not require extensive demeanor
testimony. The Courts use a wider scope of claim interpretation and a
different burden of proof when examining the claims of the patent
challenger.1 60 Reexamination by the PTO can never take the place of a fullblown analysis in a court trial. However, courts usually defer to the
findings of the PTO concerning technical matters. Thus, it is important that
if reexamination is undertaken, it must be carried out properly, and by
experienced examiners. The JPO, for example, usually allows the
reexamination requester a second chance to rebut the patentee's arguments
during invalidation trials. 161
2.

Reexamination is Not Mandatory and is Not Integrated Well with
Trial Practice.

Statutory reexamination findings often have no impact on litigation
because they are usually not available at the early stages of a lawsuit when
they would be most helpful to resolve a conflict. There are two reasons for
this. First, reexamination is not commenced in a timely manner.
Reexamination requests are frequently made late, after initiation of a
lawsuit. Second, it frequently takes a long time (over a year) to reexamine
and appeal reexamination findings.
If reexamination were better
coordinated with litigation so that results were timely available, courts
158
159
160
161

Id.
35 U.S.C. § 112. Issues pertaining to the specification itself are not reexamined.
Ethicon v. Quigg, 849 F.2d at 1427.
See DOING BusINEss, supra note 10, § 2.13(1].
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would be more willing to stay proceedings and to use reexamination
findings to save time and money.
Congress considered the issue of when to initiate reexamination of
patents involved in litigation in the 1970s. An early draft of the
reexamination legislation proposed then would have required any patent or
publication relied on as evidence of patent invalidity during litigation to
have been first considered by the PTO.
Unfortunately the final
62
reexamination statute passed by Congress does not include this provision.1
This has caused confusion. For some years-the PTO and the courts waited
for each other to make a final decision on patent validity when both were
examining a patent.163 This situation evolved from the fact that both the
PTO and the courts can invalidate patents.
An extreme example of the confusion over whether the courts or the
PTO should take the lead in patent reexamination is the ten-year-long E.L
DuPont v. Phillips Petroleum litigation.164 In this case, patent reissue was
requested one year before litigation and the defendant requested reexamination four years into the litigation (in 1985), yet after approximately nine
years of litigation in which the patent claims were rejected several times, the
PTO had not rendered a binding decision. The court noted that a seasonable
decision by the PTO might save a great deal of court time and expense. 165
The problem of excessively long litigation was partly solved when the
CAFC declared in Ethicon1 66 that the statutory meaning of "special
dispatch" by which reexamination was to be expedited, did not allow
suspension of patent reexamination pending the outcome of co-pending
patent validity litigation in a district court. 167 The poor coordination
between the courts and the patent office over their shared responsibility may
exist in Japan as well. 168
The second time-related reason why patent reexamination does not
promote the early settlement of patent disputes is that patent reexamination
through the appeals stage can take much time. Unlike the European opposi162 See Benson, supra note 12, at 228. A key feature of the original system proposed by the Patent,
Trademark and Copyright Law Section of the American Bar Association in 1974, is to prevent the use of
prior art patents or publications in litigation to invalidate a patent unless they were first presented to the
PTO.
163 See, e.g., E.I. Du Pont De Nemours v. Phillips Petroleum, 720 F.Supp 373 (D. Del. 1989).
164 Id
165 1d at377-81.
166 Ethicon v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
167 Id
168 See DOING BUSINESS supranote 10, § 2.13[1][i].
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tion system, which uses a panel of experienced examiners in the Opposition
Division, 169 the PTO often begins reexamination by giving the work to the
original examiner of the patent and a provision exists to change
examiners.1 70 By starting the reexamination at the lowest administrative
level, U.S. patent reexamination, in contrast to European patent
reexamination takes more time. Appeals from the U.S. examiner have to go
through the PTO board and then to the CAFC.
Unfortunately, reexamination results are not timely available to settle
disputes because after reexamination, a lengthy appeals process is
sometimes used. 17 1 Congress responded to the need for rapid settlement of
questionable patents by having PTO reexaminations conducted "with
special dispatch."1 72 It is equally important that reexamination through
appeal to the CAFC be conducted with special dispatch. The small group of
patents which enter litigation are very important because unlike the majority
of issued patents, they are considered valuable enough to enforce.
However, Congress did not expedite the appeals process by stipulating that
only experienced examiners handle reexamination.
3.

PTO Reexamination Does Not Satisfy Judicial Due Process
Requirements.

The strongest criticism of reexamination of U.S. patents by the PTO
is a judicial one. Reexamination results are often not respected and
reexamination is often avoided because a non-patentee reexamination
requester has no right to participate in reexamination after initiation and
cannot even appeal the results, yet the requester is adversely affected by
reexamination. 173 Juries and judges are often reluctant to challenge
169 The European Patent Convention states:
An Opposition Division shall consist of three technical examiners, at least two of whom shall
not have taken part in the proceedings for grant of the patent to which the opposition relates. An
examiner who has taken part in the proceedings for the grant of the European patent shall not be
the Chairman. Prior to the taking of a final decision on the opposition, the Opposition Division
may entrust the examination of the opposition to one of its members ....
European Patent Convention, art. 19(2), reprintedin GERALD PATERSON, THE EUROPEAN PAENT SYSTEM
app. 1(1992).
1
70 37 C.F.R. § 1.525 (1994).
171 35 U.S.C. § 306 (1988).
172 35 U.S.C. § 305 (1988).
173 See Benson, supranote 12, at 227-31,236-37.
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reexamination results on their technical merit even though in general, only
one side has been heard.' 74 Therefore, the requester is frequently bound by
the reexamination results. This inequitable situation is probably responsible
for the infrequent use of reexamination by non-patentees in the U.S.
Japanese patent reexamination on the other hand, does not have this
problem because the reexamination requester has at least one chance in
practice to rebut the patentee's arguments.175 Giving these important due
process rights to non-patentees in the U.S. system was debated at length by
the American Bar Association ("ABA") committee which conceived the
original reexamination proposal. 176 The attorneys on this committee
decided that the final decision on patent validity should not be made in the
1 77
PTO but that the courts should have the final say in the matter.
Furthermore, there was a concern that the infringer might prejudice her
position in the district court if he participated to any significant degree in an
inter partes proceeding in the PTO. This strong influence of the ABA seems
irresponsible because litigators would lose great profits if infringement
178
litigation were a less favored route to settle patent conflicts.
Because of the technical complexity of patent litigation, it appears
that the fears of the committee that developed the reexamination system
Technical validity determinations are
have been realized anyway.
occasionally being made in the PTO in an ex parte forum where only one
side is heard. When this happens, a court often will not have the final say
because many judges and juries realize their technical limitations and give
great weight to the PTO's findings. 179 Therefore, the non-patentee
174 Due to a compromise with the ABA over the wording of the reexamination statute, the nonpatentee has the right to respond once to the patentee's reply to the PTO's initial decision to conduct reexamination but before the first office action of the reexamination. This greatly watered down provision is
rendered meaningless by the procedural strategy whereby the patentee simply waits until the first office
action after the reexamination has started. Consequently, the party requesting reexamination must make
serial reexamination request(s) and incur further delays in order to have any input to the reexamination
process.
175 DOING BUSINESS, supranote 10, § 2.13[l][e],[f].
176 See Benson, supra note 12, at 227-31.
177 Ronald B. Coolley, Patent Jury Issues: What the Federal Circuit Has Done and Will do in
Comparisonwith Standardsof Review Establishedby the Other CircuitCourts,67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'y 3, 16-19 (1985).
178 The ABA was a highly prejudiced 'party since the patent litigators had a great deal of litigation
profits at stake. Even though the ABA did not violate the rules that the legal profession created for itself,
the public and inventors were not properly involved in these discussions. There is no evidence that inventors or the public at large, for whom the patent system exists to serve, elected the participating attorneys to
represent their interests.
179 See generally Hofer, supranote 144, at 107-33; Pegram, supranote 144, at 493.
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reexamination requester is already prejudiced under the present law because
she has limited opportunity to participate in the reexamination.
As technology becomes more complicated and difficult to explain to
the layperson, this problem will only get worse. It is inevitable that technically trained persons will be relied on to determine the technical problem of
patent validity. The issue is no longer whether this should be done. The issue is how we can design a more neutral environment where technical
experts can do their job without the influence of payment for particular
opinions in inter partes litigation. To the extent that non-U.S. citizens use a
different system for handling this problem, they may feel they are victims of
unjust actions.
VI.

STATUTORY REEXAMINATION AS A SOLUTION TO THE U.S. LITIGATION
PROBLEM

The nexus of the reexamination problem is how to coordinate the
courts with the PTO so that the strengths of each institution are utilized to
resolve patent validity questions. The PTO was created to search and
examine new technology and to grant patent rights. In theory, it contains an
impartial pool of technical expertise for this purpose. To ensure that patent
issues are handled properly, all legal professionals who practice before the
PTO must have technical training and pass a special bar. The courts, on the
other hand, do not contain the technical expertise of the PTO, but are best at
handling issues decided by demeanor testimony. Even if technically trained
law clerks were available, they would have to be used by juries as well as
18 0
It
judges, since juries often make decisions concerning scientific merit.
is difficult for courts to correctly decide technical issues by long, drawn out
jury trials in which expert witnesses hired to promote their employers'
viewpoints battle over the meaning of technical advances in front of
uncomprehending juries.
This is particularly onerous to Japanese
participants because Japanese courts have their own experts which are not
hired by one side.1 81 The courts and the PTO have complementary talents.
180 See, e.g., Stevenson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 713 F2d. 705, 710 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Allen
Archery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co., 819 F2d. 1087, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Although the ultimate issue of
validity is a question of law several elements of this issue such as anticipation, obviousness, novelty, and
utility are totally or at least in part factual questions.
181 Japanese Courts, along with courts in European civil law countries, have their own experts.
These experts are not paid by one side to give biased opinions. If it is unacceptable to rely on the PTO for
patent reexamination, then technical law clerks could be supplied to courts which hear patent and other
technology-related litigation. As a start, certain districts in which this kind of litigation is concentrated
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The most efficient disposition of patent validity reexamination should
encompass both the courts and the PTO.
To better coordinate the courts with the PTO, three major changes are
needed. First, technical issues which are best handled by the PTO should be
delegated to it. The PTO should prosecute reexaminations at the level of
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences by experienced examiners
with the additional purpose of assisting the courts. The board should be
required to give full statements of reasons for allowing claims so that its
Second,
work product could be more fully used by the courts.
who
intend
parties
by
filed
and
timely
reexamination should be mandatory
to present patent invalidity as a defense in litigation. Third, a reexamination
requester should be given a genuine opportunity to file a response during
the reexamination, and both parties should be given the right to appeal to
the CAFC. The requester would, like the patentee, be bound by the results.
The following is a list of patent validity questions that are decided by
litigation. I suggest that the first five be delegated to PTO reexamination.
Federal district courts can review and set aside PTO reexamination findings
under the clearly erroneous standard. 182 Therefore, exclusively delegating
these first five validity questions to the PTO would not obviate the court's
role in overseeing the reexamination process.
DELEGATION OF PATENT VALIDITY QUESTIONS
BETWEEN THE COURTS AND THE PTO:

Validity
Question
double patenting
novelty

Present
Forum
PTO & court
PTO & court

Proposed
Forum
PTO
PTO

non-obviousness
enablement (§112)

PTO & court
court

PTO
PTO

invention description (§112)

court

PTO

(benefit of previous filing)
best mode (§112)
invention priority

court
court

court
court

(e.g. Delaware, Northern District of California, Eastern District of Virginia) could be given technical law
clerks and venue for patent cases could be restricted to these districts. This could be paid for by raising the
court filing fee for patent cases.
182 Fregeau v. Mossinghoff, 776 F.2d 1034, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

VOL. 3 No. 2

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

public use

court

court

wrong inventor
invention date (rule 13 aff.)
fraud and misrepresentation

court
court
court

court
court
court

Reexamination requests directed to the first five issues listed above
should be timely and the PTO must carry out reexamination quickly in order
that the courts may use the results. A party involved in an infringement suit
should be required to file a reexamination request for any patent whose
invalidity based on one or more of these five issues will be asserted as a
defense at trial. The reexamination request should occur before or at the
same time as the first responsive pleading in order to preserve a patent
invalidity defense. Mandating a request for reexamination at such an early
time is not an unreasonable burden. The reexamination requester would
(according to this proposal) have the right to make a further response later
in the reexamination proceeding and would have the right to appeal the
findings.
The PTO carries out reexamination by "special dispatch" under the
present rules183 and, since the Ethicon decision, does not stay proceedings
in order to wait for a court settlement. 8 4 One problem is the time required
to process appeals from reexamination findings. This problem would be
alleviated if reexaminations were conducted by the PTO board and if the
findings could be appealed to the CAFC.
It is very important that the reexamination requester be allowed an
opportunity to submit comments during the reexamination. The U.S. examiner should be able to ignore submitted evidence and to request further
evidence from any party. It would also be useful, considering the res
judicata aspect of reexamination, that the U.S. examiner be able to request a
court to obtain or to reexamine evidence for the reexamination. 185 This
would more fully utilize the court's expertise in judging demeanor
testimony. Additionally, the volume of submissions could be limited by
using page limits and requiring a "preliminary statement" as is done now at
the beginning of interference proceedings. 186 Giving the reexamination
183

37 C.F.R.

§ 1.550(a)

(1994).

184 Ethicon v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
185 Patent examiners are not trained in law. Only the courts can properly deal with demeanor
testim186" Papers which are not authorized by the rules
or requested by the examiner-in-chief can be
returned unfiled and preliminary statements are filed at the beginning of an interference. PAT. &
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requester an opportunity to submit comments would not be a burden to
Japanese parties who already do this as part of the opposition procedure and
for invalidity trials at the JPO to challenge the granting of Japanese
87
patents.1
1.

Possible Criticisms of the Proposed Changes to Statutory
Reexamination

Possible criticisms of the proposed changes to strengthen statutory reexamination and increase reliance on it for resolution of patent disputes are:
1) reexamination removes the presumption of validity that exists in court
trials for patent infringement and is too prejudicial to patentees; 2) because
different reexamination criteria are used by the courts and the PTO,
reexamination will not significantly decrease the work load of the courts; 3)
making reexamination an inter partes proceeding has great potential for
abuse and delay; and most importantly 4) shifting the responsibility for
reexamination from the courts to the PTO unconstitutionally deprives
parties of the right to trial by jury. Although these are genuine concerns, the
proposed changes would not produce these negative effects.
a.

Statutory reexamination does not violate the presumption of patent
validity

The purpose of statutory reexamination is to remedy administrative
error. In Patlex Corp. v. Mossinnghoff,188 the presumption of patent
validity was held not to be a property right subject to constitutional
Another criticism is that once
protection from reexamination. 189
reexamination is opened, the PTO is not limited to the arguments presented
by the requester and other reasons for invalidating the patent may be
considered sua sponte by the examiner. This argument misses the point that
the purpose of reexamination is to correct mistakes made by the PTO, and
neglects the fact that the PTO has the power to reexamine patents sua
sponte at any time anyway. Additionally, reexamination, because of its

TRADEMARK OFF., DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2300.02 (Mar.

1994)i87 Patent Law § 123, in JAPANESE LAWS, supranote 7.
188 Patlex Corp. v. Mossinnghoff, 758 F.2d 594 at 602 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
189 Id.
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rigorousness, usually results in a stronger patent (more valuable to the
patentee) which is more difficult to challenge in court proceedings.
b.

The proposed changes would decreaselitigation because opinions of
technical experts aregiven greatdeference by the courts

Although the courts use a much wider scope of review when
examining patent validity, in practice they defer to the technical findings of
non-partisan administrative agencies which are responsible for making
technical judgments. The proposed changes would only broaden the
purview of PTO reexamination to include technical issues that it is
particularly well equipped to reexamine but which it is not currently
allowed to examine.
Some commentators feel that administrative agency expertise is well
respected and that courts are often reluctant to substitute their inexpert judgment for the expertise of an administrative agency.190 This is, in fact, a
major reason why juries are perceived as being pro-patentee and why,
unlike other civil litigation, most patent litigation is carried out by jury
trial. 19 1 It could even be argued that under present rules, statutory
reexamination has too much influence on the courts in view of the fact that
the non-patentee has no right to participate in or appeal the results of
reexamination. Thus, the opposite problem of prejudice to the non patentee
party needs to be addressed by giving this party the right to appeal patent
reexamination findings. This is an important concern of Japanese
corporations that are defendants in patent litigation.
c.

Patent reexamination must be inter partes if it is to achieve its
purpose ofproviding a low costforum for validatingpatents.

When the present reexamination system was designed there was great
concern that reexamination avoid the problem of chaotic inter partes
proceedings.192 It could be argued that replacing a court proceeding with an
administrative proceeding for settling purely technical issues would create
190 E. Brendan Magrab, Patent Validity Determinations of the ITC: Should US. District Courts
Grant them Preclusive Effect?, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 125, 138 (1993).

191 For a discussion of appellate cases handled by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and
the key role played by juries, see generally Hofer, supra note 144, at 107-33; Savikas, supranote 145, at
S7; Graeven, supranote 8, at 14-15.
192 See Benson, supranote 12, at 231.
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problems similar to those experienced under the Dann amendments. However, the only way to keep all disputed technical questions solely in the
courts would be to eliminate the present reexamination system. Congress
wanted the PTO to decide technical matters because it originally created the
PTO for this purpose and because of the high cost and potential for abuse in
using the courts- for resolution of technical issues.
Since the PTO has the power to conduct reexamination, the issue is
how the PTO can avoid abuses that tend to go with inter partes proceedings.
I suggest that the board be given wide discretion both to solicit information
from any party and to ignore unsolicited information from parties involved
in inter partes proceedings. The European Patent Office has experience in
this area and has evolved a policy of wide examiner discretion to curb
3
abuses in the opposition procedure.19
It could be argued that as long as technical issue determination cannot
be done in a purely inter partes manner, the potential for abuse will exist
and have to be addressed. The real issue, then, is how best to combine
technical expertise with inter partes information in a non-partisan manner.
c.

The right tojury trialdoes not conflict with statutory reexamination.

Because the proposal would transfer technical fact finding from the
jury to the PTO, the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial is implicated.
This is the most important criticism of statutory patent reexamination, and
much has already been written about what aspects of civil litigation are
subject to the Seventh Amendment requirements.1 94 In practice, although
patent obviousness is generally considered to be a legal question, district
courts frequently let the jury rule on obviousness, and simply assume that
factual findings were made to support the verdict. 195 This exacerbates the
appearance of unpredictability of patent rights for Japanese participants.
Patent validity is already subject to reexamination by a non-Article III
court and by administrative agencies without benefit ofjury trials. The U.S.
Claims Court determines patent validity and allows no jury trials (there are
193 The European Patent Office Technical Board of Appeal held that after the initial response to a
notice of opposition, observations from parties are only admissible in the exercise of the discretion of the
Opposition Division or a Board of Appeal, if such observations are necessary and expedient. See 12 OFF.
J. EUR. PAT. OFFICE 470 (1990).

194 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Death of the IrreparableInjury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 688
(1990%95 See Cooiley, Obviousness, supranote 7, at 205.
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no jury trials in suits against the government).196 Although the defendant in
U.S. Claims Court suits is the government, patent validity holdings have
estoppel value and influence the licensing of patents to private
businesses. 197
Another strictly non-jury forum is the International Trade
Commission ("ITC"). A patent holder can sometimes choose to sue in an
ITC administrative proceeding instead of a district court. The ITC
administrative court rules on patent validity in patent infringement cases
although its jurisdiction is limited to international trade matters and
invalidation of patent claims does not have estoppel effect on district
courts.198 Assuming that a jury is only responsible for findings of fact and
that a court is responsible for findings of law, the standard of review for ITC
patent validity decisions is not different from the standard of review for
district court patent validity decisions. And the ITC's decisions are
independent from patent validity decisions of the district courts. 199
The PTO itself has statutory authority to determine the validity of issued patent claims (without a jury) involved in interferences and in
reexaminations. 200 A finding of patent invalidity by the PTO in an
interference results in cancellation of the claims. Although the PTO does
not use a jury, an adversely affected party can seek review of the ex parte
rejection of the patent application by civil action in a district court under
Title 35 Section 146.201 However, in this event, the facts found by the PTO
will be treated with the same standard of review as facts determined by a
jury. 202 Thus, the PTO's work product will not be challenged by a jury.

196 Id
197 Id
198 Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Travenol Lab., 745 F.2d 1,5 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
199 In In re Certain Steel Rod Treating Apparatus, the International Trade Commission found a
patent to be valid but a District Court subsequently found the same patent to be invalid. The ITC issued a
temporary restraining order while the District Court case was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit. In re Certain Steel Rod Treating Apparatus and Components Thereof, USITC Pub. 1210,
Inv. No. 337-TA-97 (Jan. 1982). See also Magrab, supranote 190, at 127-38. The argument is made that
most ITC decisions are given preclusive effect in U.S. District Courts but that for patent cases courts are
split on this point. The view is advanced that patent validity determinations by the ITC should be given a a
rebuttable presumption of preclusive effect and therefore the burden should be on the challenging party to
prove that she did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of patent validity in the ITC
hearmn
. 37 C.F.R. § 1.601 (1994).
2i0
201 35 U.S.C. § 146 (1988).
202 35 U.S.C. § 146 (1988) ("The testimony and exhibits of the record in the Patent and Trademark
Office when admitted shall have the same effect as if originally taken and produced in the suit.").
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The reexamination of patent validity by the PTO seems to be
consistent with the "public rights" doctrine in which Congress enforces
public rights created by statutes within its power to legislate, and to decide
whether these rights are subject to jury trial. Whether patent rights fall
under this doctrine is not completely clear.
On one hand, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that in creating new
"public rights," Congress could assign their adjudication to 2an
03
administrative agency with which a jury trial would be incompatible.
Patent rights, on the other hand, have existed as long as Congress itself and
may not be new public rights created by Congress in the meaning that the
Supreme Court used. Perhaps a better way to understand the problem is to
look at the bundle of patent rights as a composite of private common law
by
rights and the public right to exclude others. This approach was taken 20
4
Company,
Tool
&
Die
Crown
In
the Supreme Court in a 1923 decision,
Justice Taft declared that all a patentee acquires from a patent grant is the
(public) statutory right to exclude. The (private) common law right to
make, use and vend one's own invention was not subject to the patent
05
statutes. 2
The power of the PTO to reexamine patent validity may be best explained as a means by which this administrative agency is allowed to fix its
own mistakes. This was the approach taken by the CAFC in Patlex,20 6 in
which the Court declared that the reexamination statute belongs to "the
class of 'curative' statutes, designed to cure defects in an administrative system." 2 07 The court determined that fair opportunity for judicial review and
full respect for due process is essential in the reexamination of patents and
declared that "when these standards are met, the Constitution does not require that we strike down statutes, otherwise having a reasonable legislative
purpose, that invest administrative agencies with regulatory functions previously filled by judge and jury."208
The more pertinent constitutional challenge therefore is not whether a
jury has the right to compete with the PTO in determining patent validity,
but rather, ensuring that judicial review and due process are maintained at
all times during reexamination by the PTO. As long as the PTO has
203
204
205
206
207
208

Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24 (1923).
Id; see also Joy Technologies v. Quigg, 12 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Patlex Corp. v. Mossinnghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 603 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Id; see also Graham & Foster v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409 (1931).
Patlex Corp. v. Mossinnghoff, 758 F.2d at 604-05.
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responsibility for conducting reexamination, the reexamination findings will
have estoppel effects on at least one side of each disputed issue. It follows
that the proceedings must be inter partes and all parties must be given the
right to appeal the reexamination results in recognition of this fact. By
shifting technical reexamination to the PTO (with proper appeals), Japanese
parties would feel less victimized by the present jury system.
The prospects for a strengthened U.S. patent reexamination system
have become improved within the last year. As a result of bilateral discussions between the U.S. and Japan 20 9 a bill to strengthen the U.S. patent

reexiamination statute was submitted to Congress in August of 1994.210
This bill would have enlarged the scope of statutory patent reexamination,
allowed third party requestors of reexamination to participate in the
proceedings, and give them the right to appeal the results of
reexamination. 2 11 The bill, however, was not passed.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Japanese and U.S. patent enforcement problems share the same
underlying imperfect coordination of patent office technical expertise with
the courts' expertise in adjudicating proceedings via demeanor testimony.
Japanese patent litigation primarily revolves around the issue of patent
technical scope interpretation by the courts. This is a technical problem but
the technical agency is normally not allowed to assist the courts. As a
result, the courts frequently re-interpret a patent in a manner different from
the patent office and patent litigation in courts primarily revolves upon
patent technical validity issues. U.S. citizens who hold Japanese patents
feel victimized by a system which they cannot understand because it does
not seem to follow consistent principles. Americans feel victimized when
their basic technology is not protected by the consistent application of the
doctrine of equivalents.
U.S. patent litigation on the other hand, primarily revolves around
patent validity determination by the courts. This is a technical problem but
the PTO is normally not allowed to assist the courts. As a result, the courts
209 Aug. 16, 1994 U.S.-Japan bilateral patent law agreement. As part of this agreement the U.S.
PTO agreed to introduce legislation to institute an "early publication" system and a revised reexamination
system by 1996. See U.S.-Japan Conclude Agreement on Reexamination and Publication, 48 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 412 (Aug. 18, 1994).
210 S.234, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
211 Id
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reexamine patent validity in ways that are frightening to the Japanese who
are accustomed to a more inexpensive and dispassionate forum in their
country. Japanese, in particular, feel victimized by the high cost jury
system which they feel is biased against them.
Both of these problems could be resolved by transferring technical
matters during patent litigation from courts to the patent offices. Japanese
patent validity should be reexamined by the JPO, and patent scope advisory
opinions should be made available by the JPO to the courts in a timely manner. This would encourage the courts to routinely apply the doctrine of
equivalents and also alleviate the court's problem of trying infringement
cases for patents of questionable validity. Litigants of U.S. patents on the
other hand should avoid unnecessary and costly trials by U.S. citizen juries
by using the technical expertise of the PTO. The U.S. patent reexamination
process should be strengthened by giving equal rights to adversely affected
parties and by making reexamination a prerequisite to the affirmative
defense in patent litigation. Modifying the patent systems of both countries
so that they could be used for technipally-based alternative dispute
resolution in this way would benefit all parties.
Delegating technical issue resolution to the national patent offices can
achieve real patent law harmonization because patent offices are composed
of technical experts who can agree on reality-based (not politically-based)
scientific principles. Furthermore, each country has the same problem of
judicial disrespect for the technical work product of its patent agency. This
common problem would be a suitable topic for mutual negotiations on
international patent law harmonization.

